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This paper argues that corruption is used on a systematic basis as a mechanism of direct 
and indirect administrative control from the state level down to local authorities and 
administrations of public and private institutions. Informal approval of corrupt activities in 
exchange for loyalty and compliance with the regime is commonplace in many countries. This 
paper explains how corrupt regimes maximize their position in terms of loyalty and compliance 
by using the example of the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine. It presents mechanisms by 
which political bureaucracies politicize universities in order to influence students and channel 
their electoral power during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. 
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Introduction 
Ukraine has a strategic location between Europe and Asia, remains geopolitically 
indecisive, squeezed between the West and Russia. This geopolitical position predetermines high 
interest in the country. Surprisingly, little was said about this nation since it gained independence 
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Strategic developments in the region, 
including the interests of the European Union, NATO,1 and Russia, warrant more focus on 
Ukraine in the near future. The battle for Ukraine so far has been a very bleak. More attention to 
the country’s political development may be expected over the next few decades. Political life in 
Ukraine remains terra incognita, indeed. Ukrainian authorities constantly face serious challenges. 
The ruling regime is not monolithic, but consists of competing groups. These groups’ future 
political prospects depend heavily on the popular support they can receive from the public. 
Recent political events in Ukraine that have become known as the Orange Revolution and 
its aftermath raise questions about their moving forces. Answering these questions presents an 
opportunity to learn from the events. This paper addresses the role of universities in political 
changes in Ukraine, and more specifically, the mechanisms by which universities are turned into 
active political players and the grounds on which these mechanisms operate. 
On the one hand, students are involved heavily in political actions and the voting process. 
On the other hand, higher education institutions (HEIs) in Ukraine are notoriously corrupt. The 
question to be researched is how these two might be linked? This paper presents the concept of 
corruption as a mechanism of administrative control and shows how it may be applied to HEIs in 
order to politicize them and channel student power to benefit certain candidates in the 
presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine. It uses comparisons with other former Soviet 
republics to better highlight the issue and sustain the line of argumentation. 
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Political challenges 
The current political crisis in Ukraine is not a new phenomenon for the country but falls 
in line with several previous political crises, including the Orange Revolution of 2004, and the 
period of confrontation of 2006.2 The President’s attempt to dismiss a malfunctioning Parliament 
manifests deeper contradictions between the existing political structure and the real balance of 
political powers. These include the issues of Unitarian state versus federalism and presidential 
versus parliamentary forms of government. Yushchenko dismissed Verhovna Rada3 due to its 
inability to form a majority coalition a year after the elections and function properly. He warned 
parliamentarians about such a step before. The President also issued an order to start preparation 
for new parliamentary elections.4 
The balance of powers changes constantly. If during the Orange revolution Yushchenko 
managed to ensure support of the large part of students, then Yanukovych would appear to be the 
favorite. According to the results of the poll, conducted by the Kiev International Institute of 
Sociology in October of 2008, in the 2009 presidential elections, the leader of opposition, Victor 
Yanukovych, would receive 44.2 percent of the votes, while the current President, Victor 
Yushchenko, only 15.9 percent.5 
The opposition continues to accuse President Yushchenko in an attempt to usurp political 
power in a way similar to Pinochet’s coup.6 The President insists that the elections will happen 
according to his verdict, but the postponement of the elections is unavoidable.7 The former 
President of Ukraine, Leonid Kutchma, states that, “In Ukraine, the governmental authorities are 
such that it is not clear who they belong to.”8 Kuchma hints at the state of near anarchy in 
Ukraine’s politics. Different branches of the state, including executive, legislative, and judiciary, 
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pull the country in different directions. Moreover, even within branches of the government, 
contradictions are rife. The Minister of the Interior, Lutsenko, calls his subordinates to interact 
with other law enforcement agencies only through the leadership of the Ministry.9 The lack of 
real authority results in the lack of subordination. Some ministers refuse to leave their positions, 
ignoring the Presidential orders.10 By doing this, they appear to be in solidarity with the 
Members of Verhovna Rada, who also refuse to accept the Presidential order of dismissal. Legal 
loopholes and discontent between the executive and judicial branches create a sense of anarchy. 
Judges cancel the President’s order for new parliamentary elections and the President in response 
fires judges, closes courts, and restructures Kiev’s administrative court system.11 
All of the political players use external forces to settle their political scores. They appeal 
to the public with facts and arguments that are of interest to the majority. The issues at stake 
include playing the language card, as is the case with Russian language status in the 
interpretation of Yanukovych, and attracting credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
as is the case with Premier Timoshenko.12 Timoshenko points to a possible conditionality and 
connection between the IMF loan and the recall of the new elections.13 No appeals are made, 
however, to the domestic constituents. All of the players readily change positions depending on 
their personal interests, the balance of power, and the current political situation.14 
Students become one of the major political forces, if not the major one. There are 
2,709,000 students in Ukraine, of which 2,309,000 study in 749 public HEIs, and the other 
400,000 in 202 private HEIs.15 HEIs include universities, academies, colleges, community 
colleges, and vocational schools. The number of students per 10,000 inhabitants is one of the 
largest in Europe and amounts to 578. The total number of faculty members is 192,157, and 
guaranteeing a faculty/student ratio of 1 to 14. This is especially true for Kiev, the major political 
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battlefield and the student city. Students not only equate to votes, but they also form active 
groups of support or opposition capable of taking to the streets. They can also be mobilized 
quickly relative to other groups of the population. This was proven during the Orange 
Revolution, when political parties relied heavily on students. This was reliance not as much on 
the students’ votes as on students’ street actions. Since political instability become more and 
more of a normal condition in Ukraine’s political life, the competing forces will eventually turn 
to their constituents, first of all students. In order to attract students’ votes and active support, the 
ruling regime may use different tactics, including informal means of control. The corruption of 
Ukraine’s universities may be used by the regime in order to secure such a support. 
 
The concept of corruption and coercion 
The word corrupt comes from Latin corruptus and means rotten; depraved, wicked; 
influenced by bribery.16 The definition of corruption in education includes the abuse of authority 
for material gain and is broadly defined as the abuse or misuse of public office or public trust for 
personal or private gain.17 The terms abuse and misuse, public office and public trust, personal 
and private gain, are often used interchangeably. Heyneman (2004) adds to this definition by 
arguing the following: “But because education is an important public good, its professional 
standards include more than just material goods; hence the definition of education corruption 
includes the abuse of authority for personal as well as material gain.”18 Petrov and Temple 
(2004) apply a narrow definition of corruption that regards corruption as such only if it implies 
illegality.19 Osipian (2007) defines corruption in higher education as a system of informal 
relations established to regulate unsanctioned access to material and nonmaterial assets through 
abuse of the office of public or corporate trust.20 
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Corruption in Ukraine is at a high and is not much different from other former Soviet 
republics. The 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), released by Transparency International, 
places Ukraine 134 out of 180 countries surveyed, showing the slide down from 118 in 2007.21 
A poll developed by the Ukrainian Institute for Social Research and conducted in 2003 showed 
that 78 percent of respondents believed that all or most of the government officials have accepted 
bribes. Moreover, a good portion of Ukrainians are inclined to accept bribery as a normal part of 
everyday life.22 The number of reported incidents in Ukraine rose two-and-a-half-fold between 
1990 and 1998 to 2,449, and these incidents led to 1,641 convictions.23 Numerous surveys in the 
Russian Federation reveal the same situation with corruption.24 More than half of all Russians 
had to pay a bribe at least once in their lives, while 19 percent do it quite often. Most often bribes 
are paid for medical services (51 percent of the respondents), followed by traffic violations (31 
percent of the respondents) and educational services (20 percent of the respondents).25 
Corruption is traditionally considered an indication of a weak state. Zhdanov (2001) 
presents the following view on the relation of state to corruption: “Corruption and government 
are eternal antagonists. Corruption, as a form of social corrosion, ‘eats away’ governmental 
structures, while governmental authority in turn strives to destroy corruption.”26 We argue the 
opposite based on Darden’s (2002) definition of the state “as a compulsory rule-making 
organization that is sustained through the extraction of wealth from within its territorial 
domain.”27 Darden (2001, 2002) describes the vulnerability of assets acquired by illegal means 
and the mechanism by which the government officials subordinate their lower-level counterparts: 
“Hence, the threat of exposing and enforcing his wrongdoing constitutes an enormously 
powerful sanction and places lower-level officials in an especially vulnerable position. The 
severity of this sanction allows the state leadership to practice a systematic form of blackmail, 
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with payment exacted not in cash but in obedience.”28 Darden (2008) further develops the idea 
of corruption and coercion as a mechanism of state repression and domination and considers 
graft to be an informal state institution.29 The author uses cross-country data and examples to 
sustain this argument and focuses on political events in Ukraine. This approach to the 
governance was highlighted earlier by Andreski (1966, 1968)30 and Banfield (1975).31 
Stability of the country does not necessarily mean a low level of corruption but rather a 
well-adjusted mechanism of functioning among all levels of authority, even if these authorities 
are corrupt. Shlapentokh (2003) asserts that “When life in a country is relatively stable, 
corruption, like some cancers, destroys a society from the inside without producing symptoms or 
even pain. This is the case in Putin’s Russia, where the political arena is calm in comparison to 
Yeltsin’s turbulent years in office.”32 He says that widespread corruption creates a parallel, semi-
feudal chain of command that competes with the official hierarchy. In fact, this semi-feudal 
structure is not parallel to the state hierarchy, but essential for the system. It is informal, but it 
does not compete with the official hierarchy. This structure is developed and maintained by the 
system of formal state institutions. Waite and Allen (2003) support this view of the self-
sustainability of corrupt regimes: “Corrupt systems are difficult, if not impossible, to challenge 
and change from within, especially since the power operant in such systems is self-protective and 
self-perpetuating.”33 To summarize, we offer a quote from the Russian President, Vladimir 
Putin’s, address to the Governors at the meeting of Gossovet34: “I am perfectly aware of the fact 
that I am guilty of everything, even if I am not guilty. This is fully applicable to all of those who 
are present in this auditorium today. You are also guilty, even if you do not know what I am 
talking about.”35 
 9
The concept of corruption and coercion is based on the idea that the state deliberately 
underpays its public employees, forces them to get involved in corruption in order to supplement 
their income, then collects evidence of wrongdoing or so-called kompromat,36 and coerces them 
into compliance.37 Karklins (2005) addresses the issue of the usage of kompromat for political 
blackmail and coercion and writes, “A politically damaging practice is to misuse investigative 
and judicial power to intimidate citizens and political rivals.”38 The same mechanism of the 
state-based corruption and coercion in Ukraine is described by Zhdanov, who writes about the 
selective application of the criminal law and other repressive legal measures to government 
officials and politicians and characterizes them as “The use of juridical reprisals against political 
opponents by means of charging them with corruption (or other illegal acts) when there are no 
legal grounds to do so.”39 Often the laws or the normative acts are composed post-ante in order 
to prosecute citizens for an activity that took place at the time when it was not illegal. Grey areas 
in the changing legislation are also used by the regime. Legal craftsmanship is one of the 
essential features of the government that uses its authority for the purpose of selective justice. 
The political rhetoric is impressive: corrupt politicians claim that they are prosecuted because 
they are in opposition to the corrupt regime while the regime states that it fights corrupt 
politicians. 
It seems irrational to stay outside of the mainstream of economic transition, including 
corruption, in an environment where everyone demonstrates rent-seeking behavior. The 
government forces college faculty to seek means of survival and encourages them to accept 
bribes by turning a blind eye on corrupt practices in universities. Not only the state intrudes into 
the university life, but university communities influence the state as well. Unlike in many 
developed countries, where universities lobby legislative and executive branches of the 
 10
government, in Ukraine this influence takes somewhat different forms. It is done on a personal 
rather than an institutional level. Educators join local and central state administrations, 
businesses linked to the state officials, and acquire police and military ranks through teaching in 
these academies. The adverse reaction of educators is supported by the numerous cases of 
professors going into power, occupying different administrative or semi-administrative positions. 
They occupy offices in different state and local committees and administrations, and obtain 
military ranks for teaching part-time in military and police academies. This trend is well-
observed in the society. The concept of corruption and coercion applied to higher education 
demonstrates how state interests influence unhealthy institutional environments and then use this 
influence to advance their political agenda. 
 
State-university relations 
In order to follow how mechanism of corruption and coercion may be applied to higher 
education, we will first consider the relations of universities and the state in an historical 
perspective. It should be said that at the time when the first institutions of higher learning 
emerged in Middle Ages Europe, there were no nation-states and there were no social institutions 
according to our contemporary understanding. Medieval universities did not play a significant 
role in social life and the state did not pay much attention to politicization of these institutions. 
Hyde (1972) warns against a false dichotomy between the worlds of learning and of politics, 
based on an underestimation of the social links between them saying, “This illusion is easier to 
sustain in considering periods when both states and institutions of learning had well-defined 
constitutions. By looking first at a time when both worlds were still in a state of flux, the reader 
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may be reminded that neither academics nor politicians work in isolation, but both are rooted in 
society – in this case, the cramped, violent, and competitive society of medieval Bologna.”40 
University autonomy in the Middle Ages was something natural, a part of the guild 
structure of society, and not a result of the institution’s struggle for self-governance and financial 
independence. The autonomy of the medieval university was a reflection of the organic nature of 
the social life in the Middle Ages. University autonomy was quite natural and not contested by 
the state, town community, or other forces. However, university development and its growing 
social influence urged leaders of the feudal states to consider universities as players on the 
political arena. The states started to develop relationships with the universities and universities 
had to establish certain nets of external relations. Universities had acquired not only charters, 
granted by the states, but also Papal privileges. Thelin (1982) offers a very precise description of 
how university external relations were built at that time: “The major structural gains for a 
university lie in its history of external relations – acquisition of privileges, exemptions, and a 
charter.”41 
State leaders and the church used universities for their political purposes and exerted 
control over the curriculum. By granting special status to the university, the state leader received 
a tool for influencing the town where this university was located. It granted university students 
and professorate certain immunities and privileges and consequently expected loyalty in 
exchange. In its turn, the Catholic Church was influencing states by using universities as one of 
the tools of internal pressure. From this it may be concluded that universities were historically 
important ideological institutions and gained more weight in being politicized. The church, the 
city governors, and the local leaders were all interested in controlling universities and securing 
their loyalty in order to sustain themselves. 
 12
The vagueness of the social roles and functions of the early European universities and 
their loose relations with the states are certainly not characteristics of the Russian university 
system. The university system in the Russian Empire has been developed under a different 
scenario. From the very beginning the state was initiator, promoter, financier, controller, and 
benefactor of the university system. Moreover, the state was the only institution to perform these 
functions. Therefore, the university system in the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union is 
traditionally centralized. The Ministry of Education in Russia was created at a time when there 
were only two universities in the country: St. Petersburg University and Moscow University. 
Flynn (1988) describes the creation of the university system in the Russian Empire under the 
auspices of the newly established Ministry of Education: “It soon was agreed, in 1802, to found a 
Ministry of Education whose governing body, called the Main School Administration, would 
direct all education throughout the empire through six universities, which were founded between 
1802 and 1804. Moscow State University, founded in 1755, was redesigned in 1804.”42 The 
ministry subcommittee worked on drafting legislation and statutes for universities. 
Not everything went successfully at the start. Successful reconstruction of Moscow 
University was counterbalanced by the extreme difficulties in Kazan: “At the other end of the 
scale, as well as opposite side of the empire, the university at Kazan clearly was a failure. 
University autonomy, i.e. faculty self government, was not attempted, for the curator simply 
appointed a ‘director’ while not permitting election of a rector or the convening of a council until 
late in the decade.”43 The result of this top-down approach in governing the established rather 
than emerging university was that professors did not have much freedom. There was not much 
professors could do about it other than leave. 
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In distinction from Kazan, Kharkov University in Ukraine has developed successfully 
thanks to the centralized power and effort of the state-appointed curator: “Kharkov was not so 
badly off as Kazan, in great part because its curator S. O. Potocki, energetically pursued his task 
in recruiting faculty, insisted on the election of rector and council according to the statutes, and 
even found a way to borrow students from the church’s local college, when too few students 
enrolled to make feasible the opening of the university in 1805.”44 The centralized effort of the 
state brought forth fruits. According to Flynn (1988), “By the late 1830s, none of the universities 
had fewer than four hundred students while Moscow enrolled nearly nine hundred.”45 This state 
involvement in the process of university building may be explained by two facts: first, the state 
was the only force capable of creating the university system; and second, the state was interested 
in creating a system where state control would be an immanent part of the existence of the 
universities. 
Flynn (1988) describes the position of the state authorities regarding control over 
universities: “Tsar Nicolas I meant clearly to answer the university question by blocking the 
university’s ability to promote change. He wanted the universities to serve the common good by 
supporting the autocratic Russia he had inherited from Peter the Great and his successors. This 
proved difficult, perhaps impossible, even in the short run. It was difficult even to find new 
rectors, unless the government was willing to pass over the men obviously best qualified for the 
posts. Thus, the rectors appointed were the same men previously elected.”46 A strong state 
facilitated the development of the university system in the Russian Empire, but at the same time 
significantly restricted university autonomy that would appear quite natural in a different setting. 
The Soviet system of higher education inherited some of the essential features of its predecessor 
– the university system of the Russian Empire. Weak university self-governance was 
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counterbalanced by strong state control. As Azrael (1965) puts it, “The Soviet Union has built up 
a single monolithic educational system under omnipresent party control with heavy inputs of 
political indoctrination at all levels.”47 
In different countries, central authorities exercise their authority over universities through 
a variety of ways. A plurality of forms of funding, both direct and indirect, based on competitive 
and non-competitive grounds, are used as a tool to exercise this authority. The forms differ 
depending upon their application to public and private universities. Burns (2000) presents the 
major forms of state influence through funding mechanisms. Another form of influence besides 
funding is formalized in certain codes, rules, regulations, and restrictions, imposed on 
universities by the central authorities. Some of these rules are obligatory for all institutions while 
others are complementary and supported by financial incentives. The universities that comply 
with the rules get access to some state and federal funds through participation in grants, 
programs, and projects.48 But there are informal ways of influencing universities as well. 
Sometimes the ruling regime can encourage universities to ignore the rules, formally set by the 
regime. 
In the US, universities and students are active players in political life. Students were more 
active in 1960s and 1970s, while universities today are more active in political lobbying.49 
Constitutional autonomy of the universities was diminished in exchange for the state and 
national grants, subsidies, and indirect funding in form of student aid and student loans. This 
trend may change in time, and public universities may regain their autonomy from the state, but 
the fact itself speaks to the tendency of the central authorities to control higher education 
institutions and their willingness to negotiate and trade the autonomy in exchange for funding or 
possibly some other benefits. Informal control of the state over universities compensates for the 
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lack of balance between the formal authority and the real power that the state has over 
universities. It may also be used in order to disguise methods of administrative control that might 
be unpopular with the public and the constituents of the system. 
In Ukraine, rules and regulations, including accreditation, curriculum, degree 
requirements, and regimentation of the academic process, are used by the state as tools of 
administrative control. Often the tool becomes more important than the regulation itself. This 
control becomes even more important when educational space is occupied not only by the state 
universities, but by independent private HEIs as well. The financial independence of private 
institutions is disturbing and so authorities are trying to develop more tools and mechanisms of 
control. The introduction of vouchers for higher education and the entitlement of private colleges 
to participate in competition for these vouchers was one such mechanism of indirect control. 
Once independent private institutions are invited to compete for governmentally distributed 
public funds, they become interested in being qualified for participation. This qualification is 
based on the discretion of the central authorities. The major task is to control not only public 
universities that always were and remain under the authority of the related ministries, but also 
private colleges. In Ukraine, universities are transformed into objects of public policy. 
 
University politicization 
The vertical structure of control in higher education incorporates the principal-agent 
frame. A special interest of administrative control through corruption and coercion is applied to 
higher education. This special interest is closely linked to and often indivisible from the general 
interest, but it is based on the distinctive features of higher education, including its special role in 
the society and its organizational and cultural characteristics and norms. Universities became by 
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far the most important institutions for political socialization nationally and even internationally. 
For Almond (1960), “Political socialization is the process of induction into the political 
culture.”50 The importance of the educational system in codifying people in the process of 
political socialization is formulated by Coleman (1965) as follows: “The concept of political 
socialization is now an accepted part of the vocabulary of political science. It refers to that 
process by which individuals acquire attitudes and feelings toward the political system and 
toward their role in it, including cognition (what one knows or believes about the system, its 
existence as well as its modus operandi), feeling (how one feels toward the system, including 
loyalty and a sense of civic obligation), and one’s sense of political competence (what one’s role 
is or can be in the system). The educational system is one of the agencies involved in this 
process, which begins at birth and, also its imprint is most pronounced during the impressionable 
formative years, continues well into adulthood.”51 
Universities have substantial political power due to three major facts. First, the university 
professorate constitutes the most intelligent part of the society and its elite. Professors often 
participate in political life, occupy public offices, and work as consultants and advisors to 
politicians, public officials, and administrators. Second, students in many countries are one of the 
major political forces that are easy to politicize and mobilize for social actions. Califano (1970) 
describes student unrest and states that Japanese radical students appear to be, by far, the most 
successful in the world in disrupting the social order. He writes: “Tokyo University was 
paralyzed by a student strike throughout 1968. It took eight thousand policemen two days to 
evict radical students from the main hall of the University in January 1969 – a two-day siege, 
similar to the later one at Kyoto, which ended an occupation that had lasted for over six 
months.”52 For Jarausch (1974), student movements are often more successful in shaping a 
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critical generational identity than in achieving practical political, social, or institutional aims. He 
points out that the failure of the student movement to reach its reforming goals, largely due to its 
elitism, may lead to the incompleteness of modernization.53 Third, universities are large 
enterprises that involve not only employees, i.e. faculty, administration, and staff, but also their 
immediate consumers, i.e. students. American students’ active citizenry position moved 
universities onto a new level. Altbach (2005) points out that “The very success of the universities 
in moving to the center of society meant that they were taken more seriously.”54 The antiwar 
movement of 1960s emerged from university campuses, where it was most powerful.55 In 
Ukraine, politicization is considered not as an alternative, an opposition to the state, but as an 
influence of the state instituted in order to gain support. 
In Russia, universities are being criticized for politicization. A plan to establish a school 
of Political Sciences at Moscow State University (MGU) is being considered part of such a 
process.56 MGU wants to resolve the problem with lack of managerial resources in the country 
by establishing a “party school.”57 Many think that the school will prepare cadres for Edinaya 
Rossiya, a political party of Putin.58 The university administration is accused of politicizing the 
university. The opposition calls students to resist such a move. It seems contradictory and ironic 
that students are called to stay away from political life by resisting changes in a political 
manner.59 The Rector of MGU insists that the university will remain politically neutral.60 Rector 
Sadovnichiy dismisses the speculations that the leader of Edinaya Rossiya, Boris Gryzlov, will 
have a direct relation to the leadership of the School of Political Sciences in MGU.61 He says 
that there are many leading politicians teaching in MGU, including Volodin, Kokoshin, 
Zhirinovsky, and Ziuganov.62 According to Sadovnichiy, this should not be interpreted as a sign 
of the politicization of MGU. Nevertheless, some educators point out that the party of power 
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Edinaya Rossiya has intentions to limit the authority of the rector himself and establish oversight 
over the university, if not absolute governmental control, then at least party oversight. The safe 
transfer of the presidency in Russia in 2007 from Putin to Medvedev became possible thanks, in 
part, to the help of Edinaya Rossiya, described by many as a replication of KPSS.63 
 
University corruption 
Higher education in Ukraine is affected by corruption. The President of Ukraine, Viktor 
Yushchenko, has asked state universities throughout the country to curtail the corruption that is 
endemic to admissions processes and called upon rectors and professors to put a stop to the 
bribery and cronyism that hold sway during entrance exams, widespread practices he 
characterized as “shameful and humiliating.”64 But education corruption is a social phenomenon 
that reaches much further than ethical and moral considerations. It has strong material grounds 
and economic rationale. Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2006) point out that the increasing gap 
between pay rates in private and public sectors of the economy urges public employees to seek 
other sources of income.65 College professors, who lost the bulk of their savings to inflation in 
early 1990s, and are now grossly underpaid, adjust their professional ethics and behavior 
accordingly by accepting bribes and numerous other benefits and utilizing their privileged 
position and control over the access to higher education. 
There is a variety of forms of corruption that may be found in the higher education sector 
in Ukraine. Bribes are but the most explicit manifestations of corruption in education. Other 
forms of corruption include embezzlement, extortion, misuse of university property, ghost 
instructors, fraud, nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, kickbacks, gross waste in educational 
management, sexual misconduct, unauthorized private tutoring, cheating, and research 
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misconduct. Forms of corruption are often connected in bundles. For instance, assigning a high 
grade to a student in exchange for a bribe implies fraud. Keeping ghost instructors on the payroll 
constitutes fraud as well. A bribe can be offered voluntarily by a student or extorted by a 
professor. In yet another instance, a bribe can be offered by the college administration to the 
accrediting agency or extorted by this agency. A bribe can be in the form of merchandise, 
service, or a monetary donation. The list of forms of corruption in the higher education sector is 
offered in Osipian (2008).66 
The Head of the Department of Economic Crimes Prevention of the Ministry of the 
Interior, General Leonid Skalozub, reported in July of 2006 that there were 210 cases of bribery 
registered in HEIs in that year, of which 11 were in Kiev.67 The number of cases of bribery in 
higher education, reported by the Ministry, appears to be but a tip of the iceberg for the industry, 
plagued with corruption.68 Admissions to publicly funded places in HEIs are notoriously corrupt, 
presenting a big business for faculty and administrators. The population accepts this situation as 
a norm. 42 percent of the parents of prospective students said that instead of wasting time on 
preparation of their children for college entry examinations, they would rather seek other ways 
and means, including informal payments and connections.69 
Osipian (2009) points out that the students in Ukraine contribute to corruption by 
choosing an easy but illegal way of receiving good grades.70 According to the Minister of 
Education and Science, Stanislav Nikolaenko, many students either create a potential for 
corruption or would not miss a chance of improving their grades in exchange for bribes, 
especially if such offer would come from their professor. The leader of the Peoples Democratic 
League of Youth agrees. The survey shows that the number of such students comprises 21 
percent in the Donetskaya oblast, 29 percent in Kiev, 28 percent in Lviv, 25 percent in Odessa, 
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and 30 percent in Kharkov. Another 15 percent of the respondents said that they would not take 
advantage of such an offer but would inform their friends of the existing opportunity. Only 21 to 
26 percent of all students, depending on the region, would not advise such unfair tactics. Finally, 
only 3 to 8 percent would inform the police of corruption.71 
The level of cheating and toleration of cheating--an indicator of the looseness of control 
and corruptness of the educational systems--may be applied to the concept of corruption and 
coercion. The tolerance of cheating across nations varies significantly. In Ukraine, university 
faculty often turn a blind eye on student cheating. They think that they will always be able to 
distinguish a good student from the rest. This perception is also based on the willingness to 
control the student body and exercise the authority of assigning grades depending on personal 
relations and attitudes towards particular students rather than on their academic progress. 
Magnus’s et al. (2002) findings indicate that cheating in universities is well-tolerated in the 
former Soviet republics while in the US it is not, and Western European countries are in the 
middle.72 The level of cheating characterizes relations between professors and their students. 
According to the principal-agent perspective, professors in corrupt universities are principals and 
students appear to be their agents. Professors exercise coercive power over students and either 
punish them for cheating or turn a blind eye depending on students’ compliance with professors’ 
demands. 
 
Corruption of the politicized university 
The emerging quasi-meritocracy in Ukraine’s universities is characterized by the 
channeling of informal authority along the vertical axis of control in corrupt hierarchies. These 
were pointed out in Waite and Allen’s (2003) analysis of corruption and abuse of power in 
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educational administration.73 Heyneman (2007) describes this type of vertical pressure: “The 
worst occasions of ‘moral terrorism’ occur when faculty colleagues or senior administrators 
request that one change a grade from a particular student. From TSU for instance: The worst are 
my colleagues who put pressure on me. …And the worst are colleagues who were our former 
teachers…. Even the dean puts pressure… It takes me feel pretty bad….The most corrupt are the 
most influential. It is very difficult.”74 It may also be true that in corrupt universities the most 
influential faculty and administrators are most corrupt. 
University corruption gives the ruling regime the opportunity to control HEIs.75 Control 
over the universities means control over their curriculum, ideology, and behavior, and is a high 
stake for regimes that want to sustain themselves. Heyneman (2007) points to the continuing 
pressure on universities from the state, offering an opinion that comes from Tbilisi State 
University (TSU) in Georgia: “The question is whether the new governments can manage the 
urge to control opinions in the university that contradict their own. According to the faculty 
member at TSU, the new government intervened for political reasons, just like the Soviets: our 
first rector in the new government was asked to fire certain professors who were not liked by the 
government. He refused, and instead he was fired….We are still in a situation when we are under 
stress for our opinions, and these could be a threat to our lives.”76 Apparently, political 
indoctrination of universities is advanced by the ruling regimes in the former Soviet Bloc 
through informal means, while academic meritocracy is no longer honored. 
The state is not interested in eradicating corruption in universities. Instead, it is interested 
in politicizing them. This may be a long term policy, because the country faces elections after 
elections. Lack of power, insufficient legitimacy, and group fights complicate political situation 
in Ukraine. The only solution for each of these competing groups is to turn to constituents 
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directly. This would be similar to Yeltsin’s appeal to his constituents during the standoff between 
the President and the Parliament in 1993. For now, there is only one mechanism: administrative 
pressure. This administrative pressure is exercised in two ways: so-called kryshevanie,77 or 
patronage, and corruption and coercion. Ukraine is moving toward a condition of permanent 
elections, but will eventually need to reach a steady state. 
While state funding of HEIs is constantly decreasing, there are other mechanisms of 
control being used by political regimes. Replacement of direct state funding as one of the 
primary mechanisms of control over the universities by the corruption and coercion mechanism 
is an obvious trend in Ukraine. Political bureaucracies take over university autonomy and 
influence students by dictating the faculty and administrators their will. Figure 1 presents the 
hierarchical structure that facilitates such a dictate, identified as the pyramid of administrative 
dictate in the higher education sector. 
 
Politicians in power 
(personal and group interest and threat to lose power) 
Central and local authorities 
(personal interest and threat to be replaced by competitors) 
Professional administrations (Ministries, departments) 
(discretion over universities and corruptness and vulnerability) 
University administration 
(discretionary power over the faculty and corruptness and vulnerability) 
Faculty (discretionary power over the students along with corruptness and vulnerability) 
 
Students 
 
Figure 1. Pyramid of administrative dictate 
 
The obligatory state accreditation of HEIs is used by the government to control the 
quality of educational programs. In addition to it, universities have to pay bribes in order to be 
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accredited. Silova, Johnson, and Heyneman (2007) point out that “Educational institutions are 
often victims themselves, as they have to pay for accreditation from state officials, and since 
accreditation is still based on input rather than performance criteria, state-sponsored institutions 
with established reputations and infrastructures are at an advantage over new or private 
institutions.”78 Accreditation adds to competitive disadvantages of private colleges as compared 
to public ones and at the same time is used as a tool of governmental pressure on independent 
HEIs. 
MacWilliams (2005) reports that “The government reportedly has investigated more than 
half of 186 complaints of abuses in the campaign last year between Mr. Yushchenko, who won 
in a runoff election, and Viktor F. Yanukovich, who initially was declared the victor in a vote 
widely regarded as rigged. Some rectors allegedly forced their staff members and students to 
support one or the other candidate, but almost without exception the beneficiary of their alleged 
actions was Mr. Yanukovich. He was backed by the president at the time, Leonid Kuchma, to 
whose administration many rectors owe their jobs.”79 The Rector of Cherkassy National 
University, Anatoly Kuzminsky, was dismissed by the Ministry of Education and Science, after 
students accused him of using coercion to mobilize support for Victor Yanukovych. Students 
demanded the rector's resignation when Yushchenko was elected. 
The voting mechanisms used in Ukraine might be “voluntary-forceful,” but freedom of 
choice is preserved. The calculations are that students will vote for the “right” or “our” 
candidate. And these calculations appear to be true as the Orange Revolution shows. They were 
true in Kiev and they were true in Donbass. Substantial administrative reform will be needed to 
change this way of doing things and getting things “done.” Ukraine faces this problem in the 
coming presidential and parliamentary elections. 
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The university faculty understand that their position presents them with opportunities for 
generating illicit benefits in addition to their miserable salaries. The government forces the 
instructors to act unethically by not paying them on time or paying them below the poverty level. 
An indulgence, as a necessary detail in the mechanism of corruption and coercion, is presented 
here in the form of informal approval, most often expressed as the views of public officials and 
administrators and the tolerance of the general public. The Rector of MGU says that the 
government needs to pay higher salaries to college faculty instead of organizing demonstrative 
prosecutions for those who collect illicit benefits from students.80 
Introduction of standardized computer graded tests intended to replace oral entry 
examinations in universities may be considered in part as yet another tool of governmental 
pressure on HEIs.81 In Ukraine, entry examinations to colleges are highly corrupt, and 
admissions based on the test results threaten a substantial portion of the faculty’s illicit incomes. 
Universities oppose the test and call to preserve entry examinations.82 The Minister of Science 
and Education recognizes that he also had concerns about the test, but states that the test is going 
to be successful. He says that some of the rectors refused to acknowledge the test and to run test-
based admissions. Nikolaenko had to explain to these rectors that if they will not recognize the 
test and will not agree with the policies of test-based admissions, he will find others, who will.83 
What he meant by that is that those educational leaders who will refuse to comply with the new 
state policies, will be dismissed or removed from their offices. Administrative pressures come on 
the universities not only from the Ministry, but from the political parties as well. For instance, 
after the Orange Revolution, the President of Ukraine called for some rectors to resign.84 
Apparently, the rectors were accused in attempts to politicize and directly pressure their 
subordinates and students in order to extract their political support for given candidates. 
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There are other forms of pressure that can be accounted for when corruption comes to 
play in unexpected forms and expressions. One of the recent cases in Russia can be used as an 
example to illustrate this play. Rady Habibov was fired from his position of the Head of the 
Presidential Administration in Bashkiriya. He is now under investigation for the case of bribery 
allegedly committed in 2003. The Ministry of the Interior of Bashkortostan, an autonomous 
republic in the Russian Federation, accuses Habibov in accepting a bribe of $5000 in exchange 
for a diploma of the Institute of Law of the Bashkir State University (BGU), sold to a “student.” 
At that time Habibov was the Dean of the Law School of the Institute of Law in BGU.85 This 
serves as an example of how corruption in higher education is used by the government to 
pressure its faculty and administrators, including even former employees. By law, statute of 
limitation for economic crimes does not expire and therefore, perpetrators involved in bribery 
can be prosecuted years after committing this crime. The criminal investigation was launched in 
August 25, 2008, and only two days later Habibov was taken for a new job, now in Kremlin, may 
be because he is one of the activists of Edinaya Rossiya. 
Gong (2002) extends the theory of collective behavior to corruption and considers 
collective corruption as a distinctive form of social interaction among people dominated by 
individual calculations and the pursuit of personal interests.86 The university administration is 
interested in preserving the student body since student tuition and fees constitute a significant 
and stable part of the university revenues. In private universities this is the only source of 
revenue. Instructors often accept bribes in exchange for positive grades on term papers, 
midterms, homework assignments, and final and examinations. There are two major reasons for 
them to do so. The first reason is obvious: faculty members make their living from bribes. The 
second reason is that the faculty members are under the administration’s pressure. The 
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administration encourages the faculty to assign passing grades to the students so that they 
continue to enroll and pay their tuition. This is primarily an issue of the institution’s financial 
survival and soundness and only then an issue of morality and prestige. Institutional reputation, 
professional ethics, and academic stance are all jeopardized by the prioritization of financial 
survival on institutional and individual levels. This type of short-sightedness and focus on short-
term benefits prevents long term plans of restructuring and build up of institutional reputation by 
universities and academic departments. 
The university administration turns a blind eye on faculty misconduct and bribery and 
often encourages faculty members to settle their issues with students and to help students out. At 
the same time the corruptness of faculty members gives the university administration a major 
tool of influence: the administration can penalize faculty members who do not comply with the 
administration’s orders. Bribery is a quintessential element of this corrupt agreement. In this 
manner the administration preserves the student body and controls the faculty, faculty members 
make their living and maintain good relations with the university administration, and students 
have their access to classes and to degrees. Of course, there are always exceptions, and one of the 
exceptions here is that the administration often requires corrupt faculty members to be 
reasonable in charging bribes, otherwise students may leave. This balance of informal payments 
and benefits is not well-regulated and so often incidences occur. Furthermore, bribes are only 
part of all the corrupt activities that take place in higher education institutions. Numerous other 
forms of illicit behavior in academia are used for the purposes of the corruption and coercion 
scheme. 
The informal top-down pressure was applied on a systematic basis during the 2004 
presidential elections in Ukraine. There is not much direct evidence that different forms of 
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coercion were in fact exercised based on the corruptness of the local authorities, administrations, 
directorates of businesses and state enterprises, and university faculty and administrators. 
However, the presence of all three factors may be interpreted as grounds for the concept of 
corruption and coercion: 1) formal and informal vertical authoritarian pressure of central 
authorities on the regional and local authorities and directorates, 2) numerous instances of 
corruption on all the levels of public policy, public services, businesses, and perceptions of the 
population about the presence and tolerance of rampant corruption, and 3) numerous indications 
that all these administrators, directors, and public officials have demonstrated their loyalty to the 
ruling president and utilized different formal and informal, legal and illegal, mechanisms of 
fulfilling their informal obligations to the regime. Apparently, the so-called administrative 
resource was employed in its full capacity by the presidential candidates even though both of 
them strongly denied this. It is symbolic that one of the first decrees issued by the Administration 
of the newly-elected President Yushchenko was a reinstatement of all the university professors 
and students who were fired and dismissed due to their opposition to the pressure to vote for 
Yanukovych.87 
 
Student mobilization 
Students are used as a moving force for political actions. For instance, in Russia, Edinaya 
Rossiya88 and Nashi89 are active and openly pro-Kremlin youth movements. Other youth 
movements, including ultra left and ultra right, radical nationalists, and youth wings of moderate 
and centrist political parties which are in opposition to the regime, such as Drugaya Rossiya90 
are marginalized and painted as political outcasts. Student mobilization has its roots in the Soviet 
system, when students were encouraged to do social service and participate in the political life 
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and extracurricular activities in HEIs. At that time, however, such activities were unpopular 
among students. 
The mechanism of corruption and coercion becomes more complex, because it is no 
longer one regime that coerces, but competing forces that use the state to gain students’ votes. 
Yushchenko with his administrative resources, Timoshenko with her popularity, and 
Yanukovytch more and more in opposition will eventually have no choice but to seek student 
support. Polls become important indicators in the struggle for power and places in the Cabinet of 
Ministers. HEIs use to be local monopolies that provided instruction in certain fields, but this is 
no longer the case. One can study economics, management, computer sciences in just about 
every HEI in every city. Most of the population in Ukraine, around 70 percent, lives in urban 
areas. Thus, competition for influence over students becomes sharper. Political groups try to 
influence HEIs within their respective territorial domains. HEIs become more independent, 
harder to influence from the outside. Because of the real political competition, votes are now 
counted and fought over for real. 
The retired are a growing group due to demographics, but they may be less active now 
than they were in early 1990. Students may play more significant role. Thus, the fight for 
students’ votes becomes fierce. Political indoctrination of the academia occurs through targeting 
faculty and administrators. It is cheaper for a political group to gain the support of students 
through the indoctrination of the HEI, than to gain it directly from each student. Thus, there is no 
reason for the state to dismantle the corruption and coercion mechanism. 
Students are young and healthy, and so can spend hours and days in winter cold to 
demonstrate support for their leaders and press on the authorities. Students are independent; 
some live in students’ dormitories and so are free from their parents’ supervision, and most have 
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no family responsibilities. They easily accept others’ dominant points of view and are easily 
manipulated and influenced ideologically. Students have small life experience, they are 
idealistic, enthusiastic, energetic, easy-going, and easily communicate among themselves and 
pass ideas and information from person to person. They are intelligent, inventive, attracted to 
social events, like to socialize, are easy to mobilize, and often cheap to buy. Students are 
concentrated in higher education institutions; they come to colleges every day and at the same 
time can easily skip a class or a day, or even a week, especially with an indulgence from their 
faculty and administrators. They have plenty of free time and like changes. And, finally, they 
symbolize future and are future. Times when retired people were used as a major political 
resource are gone. Students are quite a representative group of the population with the high level 
of concentration in large cities. It is also true that since the Soviet times, they traditionally remain 
politically passive, indifferent, and alienated. 
The key question for those in power is how to make them politically active and channel 
their activity in the right direction. The answer is in different approaches to the different groups 
of students. Traditionally, students in Eastern Ukraine, even though they might not be well-
disciplined, but just as their parents on the big industrial enterprises, they tend to follow orders 
from their immediate supervisors – university administration and faculty members. Facts show 
that students were taken from the classrooms to attend meetings and demonstrations in support of 
Yanukovych and to vote at the voting stations.91 
People’s perceptions about the youth’s role in the 2004 Presidential elections are quite 
different depending upon location – Eastern Ukraine, including its stronghold Donbass, or 
Western parts of Ukraine and Kiev. One opinion commonly expressed in Donbass regarding 
student involvement in demonstrations in Kiev is as follows: “Of course, there are a lot of fooled 
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youth, but they will decide nothing. The decision depends on us – people of the east of the 
country.” As the leader of the Slavyanskaya Partiya92 characterized it: “These are the youth, 
which in early 1990s have not been attending school yet, and now these youth has been brought 
up in the spirit of hate to ‘easterns’ and ‘moskalei’93.”94 Here are two opinions about 
Yushchenko from Donbass: “Because his policy is one of a gangster. (He) is recruiting youth for 
his gangster-type settlings”, and “I do not like his policy, his methods of work, when he 
organizes all those meetings, demonstrations, and provokes people.”95 The position of the 
student-supporters of Yushchenko may be best expressed by their slogan “Kiev won’t accept the 
inmate,” emphasizing the criminal past of Yanukovych, a candidate of the East. 
Mechanisms of the top-down influence on student involvement are a bit more 
sophisticated in Western parts of Ukraine and especially Kiev – the final battlefield. Here 
agitation and propaganda by faculty members and university leaders was conducted in formal 
and informal ways on ideological as well as administrative levels. Calls for democracy and 
improvements of material conditions were used in order to raise students’ aspirations for a better 
future. Those needy students, who are now a minority, especially in Kiev, are unsatisfied, 
politically aggressive, and have hope for a better future. It is for them this characteristic was 
formulated by the mass media in Donbass: “The majority of those who were marching in the 
columns under the Orange flags are people who not only have failed to adapt to the surrounding 
reality, but also aggressively condemn the larger part of Ukrainian citizens who have finally 
learned to survive in this environment. It is exactly their faces grimaced with anger, that we will 
be able to see at all levels of the vertical axis of power in case of a victory for Yushchenko. 
Today they are pawns to the King. Tomorrow can bring them power and money. To be more 
precise: power over us and our money.”96 These are the methods that the pro-Yanukovych 
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propaganda machine utilized to influence public opinion. The government does little to prevent 
breeding corruption in universities and then employs students for political actions with the help 
of corrupted faculty and administrators. 
While the presidential elections of 2004 and the Orange Revolution are over, the 
confrontation continues, and the hottest political debates are all ahead. The politicization of 
universities and corruption are still issues and will be a problem in the foreseeable future. The 
system of higher education and net of the state-university relations are in need of a mechanism 
that would prevent top-down politicization of universities and protect students and faculty 
members from the administrative dictate. The fundamental force with which students can resist 
and oppose university corruption and political dictates is their collective action. The experiences 
of medieval universities run by the students or so-called student universities are of special value. 
The experience of medieval universities run by students is very interesting in terms of 
their control over the townsmen–suppliers of their housing, food, clothing, and other products--
and professors. Collective action that was used by the students as a weapon in struggling for their 
rights presents certain interest in many countries, including the process of unionization of 
graduate students in the US, student unions in Europe, and spontaneous group actions of protest 
by students in Ukraine. According to Haskins (1957), student universities represent an organized 
form of protection of students and their interests by themselves. This priority of student-
consumer is described by Haskins in the following way: “The students of Bologna organized 
such a university first as a means of protection against townspeople, for the price of rooms and 
necessaries rose rapidly with the crowd of new tenants and consumers, and the individual student 
was helpless against such profiteering. United, the students could bring the town to terms by the 
threat of departure as a body, secession, for the university, having no buildings, was free to 
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move, and there are many historic examples of such migrations. Better rent one’s rooms for less 
than not rent them at all, and so the student organizations secured the power to fix the prices of 
lodgings and books through their representatives.”97 
As we have mentioned before, students in Ukraine try to put professors under control in 
order to receive high quality lecture time, seminars, and updated teaching materials. Similar 
processes took place in medieval universities. Student actions were focused on protection of their 
interests. Haskins describes student demands to their professors in Italian universities: 
“Victorious over the townsmen, the students turned on ‘their other enemies, the professors.’ Here 
the threat was a collective boycott, and as the masters lived at first wholly from the fees of their 
pupils, this threat was equally effective. The professor was put under bond to live up to a minute 
set of regulations which guaranteed his students the worth of the money paid by each.”98 
Students in Ukraine are less organized compared to the corrupted faculty and 
administrators. However, in many HEIs, both public and private, students become organized to 
oppose bribery and administrative and political pressure. Groups of students go to the dean’s 
office to complain about the professor’s extortion of bribes. Students may also complain about 
political agitation and propaganda that comes from their professors and members of the 
university administration during class time. Such complaints become quite common but do not 
necessarily lead to an adequate reaction from the dean’s office, especially if the office itself is 
corrupt. Nevertheless, students execute their power. Those in for-tuition programs pay their 
money and are major contributors to the university revenue. Students in private universities are 
especially powerful in this sense. 
Student self-governance in Ukraine may be in process of its development, but this 
development is top-down.99 Minister Nikolaenko comments on the limitations and the advisory 
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role of student self-governance body by saying that “the horse will never be put before the cart.” 
In his view, student self-governance has to deal with extracurricular activities, cultural events, 
accommodations in student dormitories, social benefits, and even selection of students to 
internships abroad. Academic progress, retention, and attrition are to remain within the domain 
of university faculty and administrators. To the minister’s regret, the President vetoed the law 
about student self-governance. The relations between students and universities are clearly not 
without tension. Nikolaenko says that there is a war between students, faculty, and administrators 
and that university rectors are interested in delegating some of the authority to student councils. 
He also says that the proposed law anticipates participation of students in the school and 
university boards that make decisions. So far students are helping the Minister to remove private 
firms from student dormitories, of which there are 300 in Kiev alone. 100 
Despite the Minister’s assurances and visible interest in advancing student self-
governance, the tensions between the Ministry and the students are all ahead. One of the recent 
events is the student demonstrations in Lviv, where students picketed local authorities. The 
reason was the intent of the Ministry of Education to introduce entry examination to masters 
programs for those, who graduated from baccalaureate programs in the same university. This 
novelty would threaten students’ right to transfer naturally to their fifth and sixth years of studies 
without any payments and examinations. 
 
Conclusion 
The positive role of the state in developing and sustaining corruption is often 
underestimated. According to the concept presented in this paper, strengthening of the state 
through a vertical administrative hierarchy is exactly what is necessary to advance the policy of 
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corruption and coercion. This policy, in turn, leads to further strengthening of the state machine. 
Students in many countries are one of the major political forces and are easy to politicize and 
mobilize for social actions. The regime attempts to control students by controlling universities. 
Control over universities means control over their curriculum, ideology, and behavior, and is a 
highest stake for the regimes that want to sustain themselves. While state funding for universities 
is constantly decreasing, there are other mechanisms of control taking place. The replacement of 
direct state funding as one of the primary mechanisms of control over the universities by the 
corruption and coercion mechanism is an obvious trend in Ukraine. 
Both of the candidates have used administrative resources to influence voters. 
Yanukovych allegedly used his position of Prime Minister for political purposes. University 
administrations as well as faculty were heavily involved in promotion of “their candidate” on 
both sides. It is quite possible that some of them indeed supported their respective candidates, 
but they used their administrative, coercive, and professional power to involve students in all 
types of political activities, i.e. turned universities into politicized institutions guided by a certain 
political agenda rather than freedom of choice. Many of those who supported or opposed the 
Orange Revolution truly believed in what they were doing, others did not really understood the 
situation, some simply followed the crowd, and many were forced to do so. 
Students were pushed into politics the same way they were forced to participate in the 
May Day demonstrations in soviet times, by way of coercion, based on administrative orders 
then and mechanisms of corruption and coercion, and indirect pressure now. The presidential 
elections are over, but the battle for students’ minds and votes continues. The fundamental force 
with which students can resist and oppose university corruption and political dictate is their 
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collective action. Students’ involvement in the political life of the country should be based on 
free choice and not the coercion that comes from corrupt governments and administrations. 
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